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RESEARCH ARTICLE
Bargaining between local governments and multinational
corporations in a decentralised system of governance: the cases of
Ogan Komering Ilir and Banyuwangi districts in Indonesia
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aDepartment of International Relations and International Organisations, Faculty of Arts,
University of Groningen, Oude Kijk in’t Jatstraat 26, 9712 EK Groningen, The Netherlands;
bDepartment of Spatial Planning and Environment, Faculty of Spatial Science, University of
Groningen, Landleven 1, 9747 AD Groningen, The Netherlands
(Received 28 February 2017; accepted 11 August 2017)
Studies of the relationships between local governments and multinational corpora-
tions (MNCs) regarding foreign direct investment (FDI) remain few, despite many
countries having implemented policies of decentralisation. In response, by employ-
ing ideas about decentralisation, FDI and political bargaining, this article addresses
the relationships using two districts in Indonesia as case studies, from which some
signiﬁcant interrelated insights are acquired. One is that the local governments con-
cerned are open to FDI, with their relationships with MNCs being cooperative rather
than conﬂictual. Another is that their bargaining positions vis-à-vis MNCs are inevi-
tably inﬂuenced by varying alignments of goals, stakes, resources and constraints. A
third is that alternative bargaining arrangements are possible in the form of direct
and indirect negotiations, with corresponding involvement by other levels of govern-
ment. These and associated insights conﬁrm the importance of the relationships and
the bargaining process involved, with an ongoing focus on how the relationships
and the results thereof can be enhanced in the interests of sound socio-economic
development at the local level.
Keywords: local governments; multinational corporations; decentralisation; local
government–multinational corporation relationships; bargaining; foreign direct
investment; Indonesia
Introduction
The relationship between local governments and multinational corporations (MNCs)
regarding foreign direct investment (FDI) has become an important topic in the ﬁeld of
international political economy. It is increasingly important because many countries
have implemented policies of decentralisation. This has resulted in various levels of
government now being involved in managing FDI, with a bargaining process between
local governments and MNCs being unavoidable to ensure the beneﬁts of FDI ﬂow to
local citizens (Eden, Lenway & Schuler, 2005).
The contribution of FDI to development remains ambiguous. On the one hand, FDI
may enhance the economic growth of the host country (Bloostrom & Kokko, 1998;
Rodriguez-Clare, 1996; Graham & Krugman, 1991), improve the quality of life of its
people (Moran, 2011; Colen, Maertens & Swinnen, 2009; Baghirzade, 2012), and
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improve its economic, institutional and legal reform (Zhan, 1993). On the other hand,
Moran (2011) asserts that the contribution of FDI to economic development differs
considerably, depending on the economic sector involved. For example, in extractive
industries it may often result in more damaging local impacts than in other sectors.
Indonesia has implemented a policy of decentralisation since 2001. During the
decentralisation era, although the overall volume of FDI to the provinces and districts
has increased signiﬁcantly, the contribution of FDI to regional economic development
remains low (KADIN, 2012). Also, the investment climate has deteriorated due to insti-
tutional problems such as corruption, overlapping regulations, over-taxation, and policy
fragmentation (LPEM-UI, 2002; World Bank, 2005; Kuncoro, 2006). These matters
raise questions about how local governments may steer FDI to meet more effectively
the needs of local people.
In response, this article addresses the question: What is the nature of the relation-
ship between local governments and MNCs with regard to FDI in the era of decen-
tralised governance? This question embodies two speciﬁc questions: What is the
bargaining position of local governments vis-à-vis MNCs? What strategies have local
governments adopted to increase their bargaining position vis-à-vis MNCs? Hereafter,
answers are provided through case studies of two districts in Indonesia – Ogan Komer-
ing Ilir (OKI) and Banyuwangi – with reference to national and local policies related to
FDI management and the bargaining process between local governments and MNCs.
The case studies are timely, especially as analyses of the bargaining relationship
between local governments and MNCs remain few despite many countries having
implemented decentralisation policies. Examples include a study by Thrnik (2006) of
MNC-local relations for regional economic development in Slovakia; a study by Yeung
and Lie (1999) of the relationship between MNCs and the Shanghai provincial govern-
ment in China; and a study by Pacero (2004) of the nature of FDI-related competition
among various regions globally, with government policy interventions aimed at protect-
ing national interests. These studies are signiﬁcant, but have lacked critical information
on how local governments negotiate to meet the interests of local citizens when
bargaining with MNCs and how they seek to enhance their positions in this regard.
Decentralisation, FDI and the relationship between local governments and MNCs
Decentralisation is a transfer of power and responsibilities from a central government
to subnational levels of government or to semi-autonomous public agencies, private
entities and civil society organisations to manage important aspects of public affairs,
especially in the delivery of public services (Crook & Manor, 1998; Agrawal & Ribot,
1999; Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007). The power and responsibilities involved can be
delegated or devolved, with devolution to subnational governments allowing participa-
tion of citizens in local decision-making and the selection of political representatives
(Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007). Both delegation and devolution are relevant to the gen-
eration and management of FDI at the local level of government and governance.
Decentralisation can encourage local governments to be more open towards FDI
and to forge more cooperative relationships with MNCs. At the same time, it can
increase competition among local governments for capital investment, with local gov-
ernments being stimulated to provide good investment climates and incentives to attract
capital investment, including foreign investment (Qian & Weingast, 1997; Kessing,
Konrad & Kotsogiannis, 2007). This kind of competition can reduce the potential of
opportunistic behaviour by central bureaucrats and politicians, as well as any




























expropriation action directed at foreign corporations (World Bank, 2004; Qian &
Weingast, 1997).
Decentralisation comprising political representation encourages local leaders to con-
sider the interests of local citizens in the public policy process. It promotes public par-
ticipation in development as a means of formulating policies which may better meet
local needs and conditions (Boeninger, 1992; Bardhan, 2002; UNDP, 2009; ICD,
2016). Speciﬁcally, in making FDI and other investment projects ﬁt with local needs, it
facilitates a locally-controlled bargaining process involving local governments, local
companies and MNCs (Guthrie, 1997). Such a process is unavoidable because of the
need to consider the interests of various stakeholders, including local communities, con-
sumers and civil society organisations. This means that the necessary bargaining ought
to be based on considerable cooperation, with open and informed negotiations occur-
ring before and during the entry of FDI with the aim of ensuring local communities
beneﬁt from the investments (Eden, Lenway & Schuler, 2005).
In the bargaining process, the relationship between local governments and MNCs is
conditioned by their power to determine the distribution of FDI costs and beneﬁts
(Dicken, 1994; Yeung & Lie, 1999). This power is inevitably ﬂuid and multi-dimen-
sional, but it does have important identiﬁable components. Hence the analytical value
of a bargaining model which, in adapted form, enables the relationship between a local
government, central government and MNC to be examined by comparing their goals,
stakes, resources and constraints (Eden, Lenway & Schuler, 2005): see Figure 1.
The FDI-related goals of local governments are based on preferences and capabili-
ties, usually regarding the economic beneﬁts of FDI such as jobs, knowledge and tech-
nology spillover (Eden, Lenway & Schuler, 2005). By contrast, the goals of MNCs are
to embrace new markets, acquire raw materials, gain efﬁciencies, acquire knowledge
and technology, and seek legitimacy by developing partnerships with local institutions
and ﬁrms (Eden, Lenway & Schuler, 2005). These differing sets of goals need to be
addressed and balanced as appropriately as possible. In the process, the size of the
stakes matters in terms of whether or not local governments and MNCs genuinely have
alternative courses of action open to them. Thus, for example, if several MNCs want to
invest in a particular area, the local government involved will have increased bargain-
ing power in the FDI negotiations (Eden, Lenway & Schuler, 2005).
Also pertinent are the resources of local governments and MNCs. Local govern-
ments have strong bargaining power when they possess resources needed by MNCs,
just as MNCs are powerful when local governments need them because of other
resources for local development being scarce (Eden, Lenway & Schuler, 2005). MNCs
possess important resources in the form not only of money and ﬁnancing capacities,
but also of institutional networks, knowledge and managerial expertise. On the other
hand, local governments possess or have some control over raw materials and local
markets, labour, knowledge and technology (Dunning, 1998).
The effects of goals, stakes and resources on the bargaining power of local govern-
ments and MNCs are tempered considerably by signiﬁcant operational constraints.
Local governments are often constrained, for example, by unstable political situations
and/or by pressure from political parties and interest groups, as well as by balance of
payment issues or economic crises (Eden, Lenway & Schuler, 2005). On the other
hand, MNCs are constrained, for example, by international, national and local laws and
by previous or ongoing contractual commitments and experience (Argyres & Liebesind,
1999). In essence, the larger the constraints faced by a local government or MNC, the
weaker its bargaining power.




























Local governments and MNCs can adopt, or beneﬁt from, different strategies and
associated arrangements in support of their bargaining positions. Local governments,
for example, can be assisted by central government controls which prohibit, restrict or
permit access of MNCs to domestic sectors; which require MNCs to forge joint ven-
ture, co-production and/or technology transfer agreements with local companies; which
limit the amount of foreign equity in local companies; which seek to foster or maintain
equality across regions; and which check or constrain exports, infrastructure develop-
ments, and impacts on agriculture and mining (Luo, 2005). In response, or as separate
initiatives, MNCs can use political lobbying to gain legitimacy and seek political
accommodation through the cultivation and maintenance of relevant personal relations,
while also invoking international regulations on trade and investment and some multi-
lateral and bilateral investment treaties in support of their goals (Eden, Lenway &
Schuler, 2005).
Generally, where there are quality institutions and good investment climates in a
district, the number of MNCs interested in investing will increase, such that the bar-
gaining power shifts in favour of the local government involved. Alternatively, the
greater the tendency towards local corruption and the greater the political hazards of
the bargaining process, the greater the potential bargaining power of MNCs (Eden,


















Figure 1. Bargaining relationship between a central government, local government and MNC in a
decentralised system.




























Research focus and methodology
The relationship between local governments and MNCs in Indonesia is addressed here
using qualitative methodology that is case-study based. Policies and regulations con-
cerning decentralisation and FDI are considered, leading into case studies of the experi-
ence in two districts: Ogan Komering Ilir and Banyuwangi. These districts were
selected because they are essentially typical districts in Indonesia: rural, lacking ade-
quate infrastructure, yet rich in natural resources, with economies dependent on agricul-
ture. Given these characteristics, but also because their success in attracting FDI has
exhibited contrasting approaches in the interaction with MNCs, the analysis of their
FDI experience is potentially useful as a foundation for understanding the FDI bargain-
ing processes in other districts and governance contexts.
The ﬁeld research was undertaken from 1 March to 14 May 2016. In-depth inter-
views were conducted with 10 key actors from and beyond the local governments and
MNCs in the two districts. The interviews addressed the nature of the FDI bargaining
process in terms particularly of the goals, stakes, resources and constraints of the local
governments, as well as the strategies adopted by the local governments as possible
means of strengthening their bargaining positions concerning MNCs.1
Decentralisation and FDI management
Indonesia started implementing a policy of decentralisation in 2001 when Law No. 22
on Regional Autonomy (1999) came into force. The law provided for authority to be
devolved from the central government to the provincial and district levels of govern-
ment, except in respect of national security, national defense, religious affairs, foreign
affairs, monetary affairs, and the judicial system. A related Presidential Decree No. 117
(1999) gave provincial governments the authority to administer the processes of FDI,
but this authority was subsequently resumed by the central government (Head of
BKPM Decree No. 58, 2004).
Currently, pursuant to Law No. 23 on Regional Autonomy (2014), the management
of FDI involves government functions being performed at all three levels of govern-
ment: see Table 1. The central government, through the National Coordinating Invest-
ment Board, issues licenses to foreign investors to invest and start businesses in the
country. This arrangement is complemented by provincial and local governments being
able to issue some permits such as location permits, environment permits, land use per-
mits, and disturbance permits as part of the requirements for obtaining a business
license (Head of BKPM Decree No. 14, 2015).
While the central government plays the dominant role in the FDI entry process,
local governments play a signiﬁcant role in the pre and after entry processes. For exam-
ple, prior to investment, local governments are able to conduct investment promotions
and cooperate with potential investors. They are encouraged to provide incentives for
investment and are able to stipulate investment plans that are connected to the spatial
economic development plans in their areas (Law No. 23 on Regional Autonomy,
2014). Then, after the entry process, they are responsible for monitoring the investment
projects to ensure that investors comply with their obligations prescribed by law,
including engaging in charitable activities as part of their corporate social responsibility,
protecting the environment, supporting linkages with local enterprises, and giving prior-
ity to local workers (Head of BKPM Decree No. 17, 2015). In addition, they have




























authority to impose local taxes and to enact local regulations on such matters as wages,
environmental standards, and zoning (Law No. 23 on Regional Autonomy, 2014).
Case study of Ogan Komering Ilir district
The Ogan Komering Ilir (OKI) district is located in the Southern Sumatera Province. It is
19,000 sq.kms in area, predominantly with low land plantations, forests and un-cultivated
land. It has 787,000 residents, who have a low level of educational attainment (only 2.3%


























































location permit location permit
environment permit environment permit
disturbance permit disturbance permit
land use permit land use permit






















Source: drawn from Law No. 23 on Regional Autonomy (2014).




























have attended university); with most of those of employment age working in the agricul-
ture and services sectors (BPS OKI, 2015). It received a central government award as the
champion of the region in attracting investment in 2011-2013 (BKPM, 2013). From 2005
to 2009, it had no FDI. Thereafter, FDI increased signiﬁcantly from IDR556 billion2 in
2010 to IDR8.9 trillion in 2015 (BPPM OKI, 2015): see Table 2.
Nature of the FDI bargaining relationship
OKI welcomes FDI, with relevant policies seeking to provide a favorable investment
climate on the understanding that, as a senior local ofﬁcial appreciated, districts cannot
survive without openness to FDI. According to the OKI Investment Plan 2014-2025
(Pemkab OKI, 2014), policies are directed at increasing the attractiveness of OKI in
the eyes of investors. The local government established a one-stop services ofﬁce
(PTSP) for investment support in 2008, with the activities of the ofﬁce leading to the
above-noted central government award for 2011-2013.
Signiﬁcantly, and contrary to expectations concerning the dynamics of decentralisa-
tion, no direct bargaining occurs between the local government and MNCs concerning
FDI, with the local government instead relying on the central and provincial govern-
ments to negotiate the interests of local citizens. A senior local ofﬁcial explained that
“in the process, investors have followed the standard operating procedure and have not
come to me to negotiate directly with me.” Another senior local ofﬁcial outlined the
local FDI process as follows. The MNCs usually have obtained their investment
licenses and have determined the speciﬁc location for the establishment of a manufac-
turing base. They come to the PTSP to apply for the environment, location, building
and disturbance permits. Where appropriate, the local government provides these per-
mits and does not engage in any negotiations with MNCs because the MNCs have
already negotiated with the National Coordinating Investment Board or the provincial
government. The essence of this process was conﬁrmed by a senior ofﬁcial of an
investing corporation.
Given the process, the OKI local government is not well placed to inﬂuence MNCs
in seeking to accommodate the district’s goals. A senior local ofﬁcial expressed
considerable dissatisfaction concerning investment in OKI in terms of local beneﬁts:
Table 2. FDI in Ogan Komering Ilir (OKI) and Banyuwangi, 2005-2015.












Source: drawn from BPPM OKI (2015) and Friarista (2015, 2017).
*1 IDR billion = US$74,758




























There are many corporations which own a right of concession for 20,000 to 600,000 hec-
tares of land. If we see the situation literally, it should be beneﬁcial for local people, but
to be honest we gain nothing. Only 200 local farmers . . . are empowered. On the other
hand, with a letter of concession a corporation can get a loan from the bank. The local
government gains nothing. Previous times, we received a small part of the money from the
tax; now we got nothing.
Despite signiﬁcant increases in the volume of FDI, the poverty rate in OKI has only
been slightly reduced, from 15.88% in 2010 to 15.3% in 2015; and the unemployment
rate has similarly only been slightly reduced, from 7.46% in 2010 to 6.89% in 2015
(BPS OKI, 2015). In response, the ofﬁcial stated that a necessary core goal of the local
government was to utilise the multiplier effect of FDI, especially in solving the unem-
ployment problem in the district. He expected foreign corporations to hire 70% of their
low skilled employees from among OKI citizens, rather than largely just pursuing their
goals of exploiting the district’s natural resources. But the bargaining stakes are low for
the local government in that, while the OKI economy is based on agriculture and plan-
tations, the number of MNCs seeking to invest in these sectors is limited.
The development of OKI relies on its natural resources. It has tremendous natural
resources and abundant land. It has 175,000 hectares of plantation land and has become
one of the largest producers of coal in Sumatera (BPPM OKI, 2015). In terms of loca-
tion, however, it is in a remote area with inadequate infrastructure. It is located 71 kms
from Palembang, the capital city of Southern Sumatera, and it takes 3 hours driving
time to get there because of the state of the roads. Also, not all of the area is electri-
ﬁed. These factors reduce signiﬁcantly any resource-related bargaining power of the
local government vis-à-vis MNCs wanting to invest in the district.
Location and infrastructural issues act as real constraints on the local government,
along with another two important concerns faced by investors. First, conﬂict over land is
prevalent in the district and is not easily resolved, with 22 cases involving conﬂicts
between communities and corporations over land ownership arising from 2010 to 2016
(Mongabay, 2016). Ofﬁcials of MNCs stressed that land conﬂicts increase their operating
costs, with compensation sometimes needing to be paid to communities and NGOs in the
district due to unresolved land conﬂicts. Second, the district lacks an adequately-skilled
local workforce to meet the demands of MNCs. MNC ofﬁcials said that, while they
wanted to prioritise the recruitment of local residents, they often cannot ﬁnd locals who
meet their recruitment criteria and, thus, have to hire workers from other provinces.
Strategies to increase the bargaining position of the local government
In 2008, the local government sought to simplify the procedures governing investment
in OKI by establishing the PTSP, which is equipped with an electronic investment
information system. The head of the PTSP now has authority to issue some invest-
ment-related licenses and permits. In response, MNC ofﬁcials acknowledged that, since
the establishment of the PTSP, the process of investment is faster, easier and cheaper
than previously.
The local government has also attempted to improve local infrastructure. Working
with the central and provincial governments, it has added 330 kms of roads connecting
remote areas to the centre of OKI, 934 kms of district roads, 80 bridges, 150 kms of
electricity lines, and 1,078 points of clean water access in 34 villages (Kurniawan,
2015). In addition, it is presently developing a toll road connecting Palembang and
Indralaya, and a solar panel energy system in the district (Kurniawan, 2015).




























Case study of Banyuwangi district
Banyuwangi district is located in the furthest east of the Eastern Java Province. It is
5,700 sq.kms in area, predominantly with forested and farming land and abundant natu-
ral resources (BPS Banyuwangi, 2015). It has 1.5 million residents, who have a low
level of educational attainment (only 2.5% have attended university); with most of
those of employment age working in the agriculture and services sectors, as in OKI
(BPS Banyuwangi, 2015). It gained attention from the national media in 2011 when
the local government received some awards from national and international organisa-
tions, and again in 2013 and 2015 when it was declared a champion district (Eastern
Java Province, 2015). It experienced a signiﬁcant increase in FDI, from only IDR 1.3
billion in 2005 to IDR 6.98 trillion in 2015 (Friarista, 2015, 2017): see Table 2.
Nature of the FDI bargaining relationship
In Banyuwangi, as in OKI, the relationship between the local government and MNCs
is cooperative, with the district being very open to FDI. The local government offers a
welcoming and helping hand in the discussions involved. In its development plan, the
mission is “to increase regional competitiveness through sustainable economic growth
based on local wisdom” (Pemerintah Kabupaten Banyuwangi, 2010).
In contrast to the situation in OKI, the local government engages in direct negotia-
tions with MNCs in the entry process, prior to their applying for investment licenses
from the National Coordinating Investment Board. A senior local ofﬁcial explained the
arrangements as follows. Potential investors discuss their investment plans with him or
the head of the local investment board. After that, they are invited to present the plans
to relevant divisions of the local government. During the presentations, the local gov-
ernment stipulates the criteria to be met, including that the investors give priority to
district employees, use local raw materials, respect local wisdom, and empower local
companies; while the investors set out some demands to be fulﬁlled by the local gov-
ernment such as in relation to land acquisition. Thereafter, in response to investment
plans which meet the criteria, and if there is agreement with the investors, the local
government addresses the ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial incentives that can be provided to
them. Financial incentives can be in the form of tax cuts, tax concessions, and land
provision. Non-ﬁnancial incentives are in the form of assistance in applying to the
National Coordinating Investment Board, in obtaining disturbance permits (especially
in getting approval from the local community), in mediating with land owners to arrive
at appropriate prices, and in dealing with the relevant agencies of the provincial and
central government. The negotiations can be intensive and time consuming, as
inﬂuenced by varying expectations and demands.
The local government is generally satisﬁed with FDI achievements in the district,
with a high of IDR 6.98 trillion being reached in 2015: see Table 2. Investment has
improved the local economy, with the district recently being recognised as progressive
in terms of local economic development (Eastern Java Province, 2016). From 2010 to
2015, the annual economic growth increased from 5.9% in 2010 to 7.9% in 2015; the
income per-capita increased from IDR 20.8 million to IDR 37.5 million; the unemploy-
ment rate declined from 4.05% to 2.5%; and the poverty rate declined from 11.25% to
9.7% (BPS Banyuwangi, 2015).
In terms of goals, the local government is keen to enhance the agriculture, ﬁsheries
and tourism sectors and to ensure a wide array of employment opportunities for local




























workers, while MNCs are predominantly interested in exploiting natural resources
and are not necessarily committed to maximising local employment opportunities.
These differences in goals often become particularly pronounced in the bargaining
process, with the stakes involved being affected by considerations of resources and
constraints.
Signiﬁcantly, the district is rich in ﬁshery resources, with the sea area of immediate
signiﬁcance to it being 500,000 sq.kms and producing 66,000 tons of ﬁsh annually
(BPS Banyuwangi, 2015). Also, 89,964 hectares of its land contains minerals, esti-
mated to comprise 8.6 million tons of copper and 28 million ounces of gold (Merdeka
Copper Gold, 2015). Such resources are potentially exploitable with active local
involvement to a greater degree than is presently the case, were it not for the existence
of important constraints.
As in OKI district, the district has limited human capacity to meet particular, and
varying, opportunities and demands of local economic development from the perspec-
tives of MNCs involved. This raises critical issues of skills speciﬁcation, acquisition
and utilisation, as founded in forms of job analysis, education and employment within
and beyond the district. These are matters of immediate signiﬁcance to economic
growth and socio-economic well-being at the local level, for which all levels of govern-
ment, communities and MNCs have responsibility.
Also as in OKI district, remoteness is an issue which, coupled with the state of
roads, electricity and other infrastructure, adversely affects initiatives to attract FDI.
The provision of various incentives and streamlined permit arrangements can counter
some of the effect, but only partly so. A limitation is where, for example, in relation to
ﬁsheries, the central government imposes speciﬁc restrictions that must be complied
with in accordance with its international sea-resource obligations and commitments.
Strategies to increase the bargaining position of the local government
Regular reviews and adaption of incentives and regulatory requirements in response to
changing circumstances can strengthen the hand of the local government in its bargain-
ing with MNCs. More concerted action can be taken to assist MNCs to develop and
use local products which are environmentally friendly, at the same time as embodying
local wisdom in regulations to protect citizens from the negative impacts of foreign
investment. The simpliﬁcation of investment stipulations and procedures can assist in
enhancing the investment climate in the district.
The local government is already active in promoting investment in the district, but
more can be done in this regard. International investment promotions are often com-
bined with other signiﬁcant events. Included are events such as the international BMX
competition and international surﬁng competition, as well as events held quite regularly
with the embassies of South Korea, Canada and the United States.
In collaboration with the central and provincial governments, the local government
is improving transport connectivity by developing two large ports, double track railway
lines, some small airports, and infrastructure for fast internet through the Banyuwangi
digital society project. Also, two large eco-industrial parks and two public universities
are presently being established. The latter will serve to decrease the capacity gaps
between the demands of MNCs and the current supply of local employees (BPPT
Banyuwangi, 2015).





























The case studies of the two districts highlight how the decentralisation of power and
responsibility in Indonesia since 2001 has shaped relationships between local govern-
ments and MNCs on FDI initiatives comprising alignments of goals, stakes, resources
and constraints. The relationships, based on differing forms of bargaining, have proved
to be more cooperative than conﬂictual. Local governments have needed MNCs and
their capital investment projects to develop their districts, while MNCs have needed the
support of local governments to pursue their economic and ﬁnancial objectives. In the
process, local leaders have been encouraged to protect and promote the interests of
their communities by facilitating good investment climates and ensuring sound policy
interventions with the aim of enhancing socio-economic wellbeing at the local level.
Decentralisation has provided local governments with some room to manoeuver in
the process of FDI management. Although the local governments discussed here have
had similar objectives regarding FDI, their approaches in interacting with MNCs have
differed considerably. Signiﬁcantly, the Banyuwangi local government has chosen to
negotiate directly with potential investors, while the OKI local government has relied
on the provincial and central governments to act in this regard. These contrasting
approaches have inevitably conditioned their relationships with MNCs in important
ways, but have not resulted in notably different outcomes.
Important strategies for enhancing the bargaining positions of local governments
vis-à-vis MNCs include the extensive expansion of road, electricity and other infras-
tructure, the fostering of good investment climates, and the establishment of effective
one-stop service arrangements for potential investors. Such strategies are crucial indi-
vidually and together, but are not sufﬁcient in themselves as responsible means of
enhancing local development. Quite clearly, they need to be accompanied by the policy
and administrative capacity of local governments to ensure FDI initiatives are appropri-
ately geared to the meeting of local interests and needs.
Disclosure statement
No potential conﬂict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1. Interview arrangements and related details are available on request from the corresponding
author.
2. 1 IDR billion = US$74,758.
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